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COMMENT
DeLUCA v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC.:* STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUE
INTRODUCTION
Amy DeLuca was born with a deformed lower left leg: her
tibia was bowed, her fibula and three toes were missing, her leg
was too short and her right foot was missing a toe.1 Amy's
mother was prescribed Bendectin to alleviate morning sickness
during her pregnancy. Alleging that the drug caused Amy's birth
defects, the DeLucas brought suit against the manufacturer.2
They did so despite the absence of any conclusive medical evi-
dence that the drug is a teratogen (an agent that causes birth
defects).3 In fact, no published study has concluded that
Bendectin is related to the type of birth defects suffered by Amy
DeLuca.4
Bendectin was approved for sale in 1956 by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA")." In 1980 the FDA re-examined
the drug's safety in response to mounting public concern that
Bendectin was a teratogen.8 The FDA's Advisory Committee on
Fertility and Maternal Health found no association between
Bendectin and birth defects, but urged that research continue.7
Although the FDA has never withdrawn its approval of Bendec-
* 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
1 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 943.
2 Id.
3 Id. From more than 35 epidemiological studies, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") believes Bendectin is safe. Joanne Wojcik, $30 Million Punitive Awrard:
Bendectin Maker Says Award Exceeds Texas Cap, Bus. Ixs., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3.
4 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 943.
5Id.
6 Id.
7Id.
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tin, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer, has with-
drawn the drug from the United States market.' The flood of
Bendectin litigation across the nation, the increasing legal and
insurance costs and the decrease in use of the drug because of
adverse publicity, has caused Merrell Dow to cease production.,
To satisfy their burden of proving causation, the DeLucas
offered the testimony of Dr. Alan Done, an expert in pediatric
pharmacology. 10 Dr. Done's opinion that Bendectin is a ter-
atogen was based on four different types of evidence." He con-
ceded, however, that the only type on which a finding of causa-
tion in humans can be reliably based is epidemiological
8 Id. Richardson-Merrell Co. originally manufactured the drug. Richardson-Merrell
later became a subsidiary of Dow Chemical Co. Ed Bruske, Judge Overturns $750,000
Award in Bendectin Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1983, at D1, D4.
I DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 943. After the first two Bendectin cases, that Merrell Dow
won, the company offered to settle with all present and future claimants by creating a
$120 million fund. Over 700 claimants agreed to settle, but the Sixth Circuit overturned
a class certification by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio. The certification was objected to by some of the plaintiffs' attorneys. When it ap-
peared that there was no way to get a certified agreement that would not give plaintiffs
the right to opt out, Merrell-Dow withdrew the offer. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig.,
749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). See also Philip E. Ross, Drug Did Not Cause Birth Defects,
Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1988, at A19.
In the first trial the jury awarded the plaintiff $20,000 for medical expenses even
though it found no causation. Merrell-Dow won on retrial. In the second trial the jury
found for the plaintiff and awarded $750,000, but was reversed by the court on a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Nonetheless, plaintiffs began bringing suits
against Merrell-Dow in federal and state courts across the country. See The Cause and
Defect of Orangemail, N.Y. Tnhms, March 24, 1985, at A22 (editorial).
"As federal dockets swelled in the early 1980's with Bendectin cases, the Judicial
Panel on Multi-District Litigation transferred over 600 of these cases to the Southern
District of Ohio for pre-trial discovery, where they were consolidated with 557 cases filed
within that district. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 624
F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd in relevant part, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989)." DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 949.
"o Id. at 943. Dr. Done has testified in many Bendectin cases.
" Id. at 949. Dr. Done based his opinion on: (1) structure-activity analysis; (2) in
vitro animal studies; (3) in vivo animal studies; and (4) his interpretation of epidemiolog-
ical studies. Structure-activity analysis involves comparing the chemical structure of the
drug to the structure of other known teratogens. He found that one of the components of
Bendectin, an antihistamine, is a known teratogen in some animals and suspected of
being a human teratogen. In vitro studies are test tube studies that use animal embryos
to test the effect of the drug. In vivo studies test the drug on live animals. Although Dr.
Done concluded that the three types of studies collectively suggested teratogenicity, he
conceded that he could not infer Bendectin's human teratogenicity from any of these
types of studies individually. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100, 1104-07 (D.C. 1986).
[Vol. 58:219
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUE
evidence.' 2 The epidemiological studies that Dr. Done based his
opinion fell short of the level of statistical significance required
by epidemiologists to establish causation. 13 Merrell Dow argued
that Dr. Done's testimony should therefore be excluded. With-
out any causation evidence, DeLuca would not survive summary
judgment.'14 The DeLucas argued that Dr. Done's testimony
should be allowed because his epidemiological evidence was pro-
bative enough for purposes of legal fact finding, even if it failed
to meet the more rigorous standards of the scientific
community.15
Epidemiology is a branch of medicine that uses statistical
information to track the incidence of disease throughout the
population in an effort to determine causation. 0 Epidemiological
studies can provide evidence of causation where the biological
cause of a disease is otherwise unknown. As with most birth
defects, the cause of a child's limb reduction cannot be deter-
mined by clinical examination."8 Thus, in the Bendectin cases,
courts have been deciding the issue of causation with purely sta-
tistical evidence.
The key issue before most Bendectin courts has been
whether the expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs to establish
causation is admissible.' 9 Most appellate courts addressing this
issue have excluded the type of testimony offered by Dr. Done
because it is not based on data "reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field."2 0 Implicit in these holdings is the
12 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 949 (citing Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1108). Epidemiological
studies observe the effect of the drug on the human population.
IS Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1109.
14 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954.
15 Id. at 945.
"6 Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation,
52 FORDHAM L. Rv. 732, 750 (1984).
DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 945.
18 Id.
See, e.g., DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 949-952; Ealy v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 897 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow, 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989); Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labo-
ratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Oxendine v. Merrel Dow, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C.
1986).
10 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 950. The DeLuca court stated:
We recognize that the district court's decision to exclude Dr. Done's proposed
testimony was heavily influenced by the decisions of other courts that have
grappled with the difficult question of whether expert testimony that Bendec-
tin causes birth defects is admissible and/or sufficient to sustain a verdict.
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assumption that, for an expert opinion on causation based on
epidemiological studies to be admissible, the studies relied upon
must show statistically significant results.2
In DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals the Third Cir-
cuit explicitly addressed the issue of whether statistically signifi-
cant results are necessary for such testimony.2 The DeLuca
court held that statistical significance should not automatically
be set as the standard for admissibility simply because it is re-
quired by the scientific community.23 The Third Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court for more extensive fact
finding on the reliability of Dr. Done's methodology and its po-
tential for confusing the jury. On remand the district court cor-
rectly found Dr. Done's methodology to be unreliable and, on
that ground and others, excluded his testimony. 4
However, the Third Circuit could have provided a better
rule of law regarding statistical significance and epidemiological
evidence. Rather than suggest a generalized balancing test, the
DeLuca court should have given specific content to its ruling by
setting a clear standard as to when statistical significance should
be required. The Third Circuit should have instructed the dis-
trict court to admit only the non-significant epidemiological evi-
dence if the district court determined that insufficient research
existed on Bendectin's teratogenicity to make an informed deci-
sion. If insufficient research exists, plaintiffs should be allowed
to proffer the best available current evidence on the causation
issue.
This Comment will first set out a brief overview of epidemi-
ological methodology. Next, it will analyze prior Bendectin case
law, discussing the two approaches taken by courts to evaluate
epidemiological evidence. The Comment will then discuss the
DeLuca case and explain the Third Circuit's holding. It will ar-
gue that courts should not second-guess the epidemiological
community's insistence on statistical significance for causation
evidence so long as there is a body of scientific research that the
Id. at 949.
22 See DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 950; Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1162; Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829;
Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1196-97. See also Michael Martin, Issues About Experts in Toxic
Tort Cases, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 15, 1991, at 3.
" Martin, supra note 21, at 7.
2'3 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956-57.
2" DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992).
(Vol. 58:219
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scientific community considers adequate to support a conclusion
on causation. Finally, this Comment will propose a standard for
the admissibility of epidemiological evidence that does not at-
tain statistical significance.
I. BACKGROUND ON EPIDEMIOLOGY
"Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determi-
nants of disease in human populations." 2 Epidemiological stud-
ies seek "to observe the effect of exposure to a single factor upon
the incidence of disease in two otherwise identical populations..
. . If the two [sample] groups are comparable, any difference in
disease incidence can then be related either to the factor or to
the sampling process, that is, to chance.126
There are two general sources of error in statistical studies:
non-random and random error.27 Non-random error concerns
the comparability of sample groups.2 8 A study must sufficiently
isolate the substance being tested to ensure that it is the only
uniformly intervening variable distinguishing the exposed from
the unexposed group. Only then can a finding of causation be
reasonably inferred.29
Non-random error is controlled by using proper experimen-
tal methods that can be verified by other epidemiologists when
24 G. Marc Whitehead & Larry D. Espel, Causation and Experts in Toxic Tort Liti-
gation: How to Use and Defend Against Epidemiology, Toxicology and Biostatistics, in
Preparation And Trial Of A Toxic Tort Case 1990, 387 PLI Lrri. & Amn,. 169, 175
(1990), citing D. AB 11AMt M. L.IEmNFEL & D& DAVID E. LU.EnNrs, FoUtwAOS OF
EPmEMIOLOGY (2d ed. 1980).
16 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 755-57. Proper studies are designed to en-
sure that the sample groups selected are representative of the entire population. Id.
CHARLE.S T. McCoRucK, McCoRhucK ON EvmENcE, §§ 208, 643, 644 (1984); Ken-
neth R Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier With the Com-
prehensible and Reliable Evidence Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evi-
dence, 32 ARz. L REv. 915, 966-70 (1990).
' Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 755-59 (ideally the populations studied will
'be identical, except for the exposure); Whitehead & Espel, supra note 25, at 176; Otto
Wong, Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease, in Preparation and
Trial Of A Toxic Tort Case 1990, 387 PLI LrrG. & AD=n. 297, 299 (1990).
29 See McCoamucK, supra note 27, § 208, at 646 n.1 (correlation does not equal cau-
sation). This involves the validity of the study. Kreiling, supra note 27, at 973-75. It
should also be noted that a proposed cause and effect relationship established by epide-
miological studies should be biologically plausible (to the extent that current biological
knowledge exists) to be fully accepted. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 762; Wong,
supra note 28, at 300.
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studies are published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.30 In
this way, publication in a scientific journal may serve as a check
on the validity of an epidemiological study.3' This Comment,
however, will deal primarily with random error.
Random error involves the degree to which a disease occurs
randomly throughout the population, independent of the sub-
stance being tested.3 2 It is likely that any two sample groups
taken from a population will have differing incidence rates due
strictly to variability of the population, i.e., chance.33 In account-
ing for the difference between exposed and non-exposed groups,
the epidemiologist must determine the probability that this dif-
ference is due strictly to chance and not to an effect of the expo-
sure. 4 Although this possibility of random error cannot be com-
pletely eliminated, the risk can be controlled in statistical
analysis by a process called "significance testing. '35
Next, to measure the strength of the association between
the determinant and the disease, epidemiologists typically calcu-
late the relative risk: "the ratio of the incidence rate of disease
in the exposed group divided by that rate in the non-exposed
control group." 36 Statistical tests are then conducted to deter-
mine the probability that the "difference in incidence rates re-
sults from sampling rather than from exposure. '37 These tests
1o See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
595, 613-27 (1988) (acceptance as evidence of validity; publication as evidence of
acceptance).
3' "The audience at which scientific publications are addressed is not passive; by its
cheering or booing, its bouquets or brickbats, it actively controls the substance of the
communications that it receives." John M. Ziman, What is Science, in INTRODUCTORY
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 35, 40 (E.D. Klemke, R. Hollinger & A.D.
Kline eds., 1980).
2 McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 208, at 644-46.
33 Id. See also David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant? 61
WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1337-52 (1986).
" McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 208, at 644-46.
" Id. See also Kaye, supra note 33, at 1337-52.
" Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 757-58; Wong, supra note 28, at 298-301;
Whitehead & Espel, supra note 25, at 176-79; DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 947. A relative risk of
1.0 would indicate no association; 2.0 would indicate that the incidence of disease
doubled after exposure to the factor. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 757-58.
Courts deciding causation based on epidemiological evidence alone have generally
required a relative risk of over 2.0; this corresponds to the preponderance of evidence
standard. A relative risk of 2.0 represents a 50% chance that anyone with the disease or
birth defect got it from the substance in question. See Id. See also Marder v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986).
37 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 757; McCoRMICK, supra note 27, § 208, at
[Vol. 58:219
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also determine the probability that the relative risk ratio reflects
the true incidence ratio of the population.-3
A. Statistical Significance
Significance testing entails setting a "confidence interval"
around the relative risk ratio within which the true disease inci-
dence rate of the entire population can be expected to occur a
certain percentage of the time.39 The predominant standard
used in scientific research is the 95% confidence interval; under
this standard there is a 5% chance that the incidence rate will
fall outside of the confidence interval and thus a 5% probability
of error.40 The larger the sample size of the study, the narrower
the confidence interval.41 Narrow confidence intervals indicate
that the estimate of relative risk is highly accurate; wide confi-
dence intervals reveal more uncertainty.4
2
644.
See McCoRhucR, supra note 27, § 203, at 645-46.
" Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of
Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 385, 397404 (1985); Kaye, supra note 33, at
1342-52; McCoRmcK, supra note 27, § 208, at 64546; KENNETH J. RommA, MoDmN.E
EPEMIOLOGY 119 (1986); DAvID W. BARNms & JOHN At CONLEY, STATIcrsi EvIDE.CE IN
LITIGATION § 3.15 at 107 (1986).
40 "The practice of using a certain standard levels of significance ... can be traced
to the influence of the eminent British statistician Sir R.A. Fisher.. ." As one contem-
porary statistician has remarked: "There you have it. Fisher thought 5% was about right,
and who was there to disagree with the master?" DAVID S. MOPE, STATISTICS CoNcEPM
AND CoNTRovEtss 292 (1979).
41 Cohen, supra note 39, at 397404. The larger the sample size of a study, the
greater the "power" of the study is said to be.
4" To help clarify the concepts of confidence intervals, power and statistical signifi-
cance, an example borrowed from a law review article on probability is useful
Assume that we must determine the likelihood that the next marble drawn
from an extremely large vat of black and white marbles will be white, given
only the information that out of Y marbles randomly drawn from the vat in
the past, X were white. If fifty prior drawings had produced thirty white mar-
bles, our best guess for the probability of the next marble being white would be
0.6. If 100,000 marbles had been drawn, and had yielded 60,000 white marbles,
our best estimate of the probability would again be 0.6. Nonetheless, these two
probability assessments are quite different; although the estimates are identi-
cal, our confidence in their accuracy would differ dramatically due to the dif-
ference in the amount of information upon which they were based. In the first
case, we would not be surprised if the actual probability of drawing a white
marble turned out to be significantly different from 0.6, whereas in the second
case a significant deviation from the 0.6 figure would be quite surprising.
This observation is not revolutionary. A professional statistician would not
have described the two probabilities as identical. Rather, he or she would be
1992]
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When the 95% confidence interval does not include a rela-
tive risk of 1.0, the result is "statistically significant" and a cor-
relation between the factor and disease is established for scien-
tific purposes.4 3 One out of every twenty such studies would be
expected to find a correlation when none actually exists."4 The
probability of error for falsely finding no correlation when one
does exist is a different matter; although impossible to calculate
precisely, it has been estimated at 50% when significance is
tested with a 95% confidence level. 5 Thus roughly half of such
studies would be expected to make the second type of error.40
Strong evidence of correlation in a sound epidemiological
study is generally considered circumstantial evidence of causa-
tion in the legal setting-causation may be properly inferred
from it.47 An example of a study yielding a statistically signifi-
more likely to say that, based on the information provided in the smaller sam-
ple, the probability that the next marble chosen will be white is ninety-five
percent certain to be 0.6 plus or minus 0.14 (that is, between 0.46 and 0.74),
whereas based on the information provided by the larger sample, the
probability is ninety-five percent certain to be 0.6 plus or minus 0.003 (that is
between 0.597 and 0.603). In making these statements, the statistician is
describing "interval estimates," or "confidence intervals," in which it can be
said with a specified level of confidence that the true value lies. Notably, the
statistician could describe the probability of choosing a white marble in the
second case as very likely to be greater than 0.5, but could not do so in the first
case.
Cohen, supra note 39, at 398-99.
43 Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 757 n.104; Whitehead & Espel, supra note
25, at 176-79; Cohen, supra note 39, at 398-404; Kaye, supra note 33, at 1348. A common
misconception about confidence intervals is that they represent the probability that the
results of a study are correct. A finding of statistical significance at the 95% confidence
interval does not mean that it is 95% certain that exposure causes disease, with a 5%
chance of error. Kaye, supra note 33, at 1347-49; McCoRMicK, supra note 27, § 208, at
645; Cohen, supra note 39, at 397-99. Rather, significance testing represents the amount
of confidence one can have in the relative risk ratio as an indicator of the probability of
correlation. A study is more likely to yield statistically significant results as the sample
groups become larger. See generally Cohen, supra note 39. This allows for narrower con-
fidence intervals and hence greater accuracy in pinning down the true relative risk for
the population. Id.
" Kaye, supra note 33, at 1342-45; Cohen, supra note 39, at 400-13.
" John M. Dawson, Scientific Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statistician,
11 THE FORUM 896, 907 (1976).
40 The first type of error (false positive) is referred to by statisticians as "type I"
error. The second type (false negative) is referred to as "type II" error. See Cohen, supra
note 39, at 411, 413.
47 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 945 ("Such studies have the potential, however, of generating
circumstantial evidence of cause and effect .. . ."). There is some disagreement among
legal scholars on whether proof of increased risk of disease for a population should be
[Vol. 58: 219
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cant result is one that linked Bendectin to a birth defect of the
stomach called pyloric stenosis. In this study, among 3,835
mothers exposed to Bendectin, thirteen had infants that devel-
oped pyloric stenosis. Among 9,511 women not exposed, thirteen
also had infants that developed the malformation. This resulted
in a relative risk ratio of 2.5. The 95% confidence interval
stretched from 1.2 to 5.2.48
Courts differ on whether epidemiological studies that fail to
achieve statistical significance have probative value in the legal
setting. Most courts have required statistical significance before
admitting such proof to support a finding of causation.40 The ra-
tionale of these decisions is that the scientific community re-
quires statistical significance before accepting a finding of causa-
tion and that judges are in no position to contradict scientists
when it comes to scientific research.50
translated into proof of causation of the disease of a specific plaintiff. Cohen, supra note
39, at 385-86. For arguments that statistical information should be sufficient to support a
verdict for the plaintiff in a civil case, see Cohen, supra note 39, at 419-22. See also
Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr.
Dare, 7 HARv. ENvmT L REv. 441 (1983); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue
Bus; Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 521 (1986). But see Sar-
gent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1940); Michael Dore, A Com-
mentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 429, 435-37 (1983); Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. Rnv. 1329 (1971); Note, Causation in
Toxic Torts; Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
YALE L.J. 376 (1986).
48 Pamela Aselton et al., Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program, Boston
University Medical Center, 1984 Ah. J. EPiDEMOL, 251, 251-56.
4" Decisions that have rejected expert testimony on Bendectin's assocation with
limb reduction because of lack of statistically significant findings include: Ealy v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow, 874 F.2d 307
(5th Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 198S);
Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
Two decisions have accepted such epidemiological evidence as admissible: Oxendine
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986) (also accepting the evi-
dence as sufficient to support a verdict), and In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Bendectin
Prods. Liab Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985). However, the jury in the latter
case found no causation and the court denied a post-trial motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict by plaintiffs.
50 Martin, supra note 21, at 4. See also Black, supra note 30, at 679-81; In re Agent
Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Jack B. Weinstein,
Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RicaL L, Rav. 473 (1986).
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B. The Epidemiological Evidence on Bendectin
In the Bendectin cases, many courts have required epidemi-
ological evidence to support a finding of causation." But the epi-
demiological evidence linking the drug to birth defects is far
from strong. The "great weight of scientific opinion" rejects a
link between Bendectin and increased risk of birth defects.52
Based on over thirty-five epidemiological studies conducted on
Bendectin, the FDA has concluded that it was not a teratogen. 3
Of the thirty-five studies, four have suggested a link to birth de-
fects at a statistically significant level, but only indicated an in-
creased risk for pyloric stenosis (a stomach defect), heart defects
and cleft palates. 4 No study has shown a statistically significant
" DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 949-52; Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1163-64; Brock, 884 F.2d at 167;
Richardson, 857 F.2d at 832; Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194; Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1108 (epi-
demiological evidence may be taken in combination with all other types in supporting an
opinion on causation). See also In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). But see In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744
(E.D. Mich. 1990), where the court held that epidemiological evidence was not necessary
for an expert opinion on causation because:
[t]he division in the scientific community over whether epidemiological studies
should be relied upon exclusively necessitates the inescapable conclusion that
experts may reasonably rely upon other types of data when forming an opinion
as to the teratogenicity of Bendectin .... A contrary finding is unjustifiable
without a pronouncement in this circuit that, as a matter of law, epidemiologi-
cal studies are the sole basis upon which an expert may reasonably rely when
forming an opinion on a drug's teratogenicity.
Id. at 749 (citations omitted).
52 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 945-46. See also Andrew Scolnick, Key Witness Against
Morning Sickness Drug Faces Scientific Fraud Charges, 11 JAMA 1468, 1468 (1990).
63 Joanne Wojcik, supra note 3.
" John de St. Jorre, The Morning Sickness Drug Controversy, N.Y. TIMES MAO.,
Oct. 12, 1980, at 113. Bruske, supra note 8, at D4. But as an FDA director conceded, it is
almost impossible to get conclusive epidemiological evidence linking a drug with any spe-
cific birth defect.
Although the FDA approved Bendectin after a panel inquiry into the drug's tar-
atogenicity in 1980, the panel admitted that the scope of the studies then available was
insufficient to rule out the possibility that the drug was a "weak teratogen." Two studies
linking the drug to heart defects and cleft palates left a "residual uncertainty" about the
drug. The panel recommended: (1) continued research on the drug; (2) a package insert
informing consumers of the current data; and (3) a warning to physicians that Bendectin
should be used only for severe nausea and vomiting that cannot be treated without
drugs. The FDA publicly announced the recommended warning and said that it was con-
tinuing to review animal and epidemiological studies. Draft Guideline Patient Package
Insert, 45 Fed. Reg. 80740-01.
More evidence against Bendectin came late in 1982 and 1983 when two studies, one
federally funded and one commissioned by the FDA, showed a statistically significant
association between Bendectin and a type of stomach defect called pyloric stenosis. The
[Vol. 58:219
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link between Bendectin and limb reduction. However, the num-
ber of children born with limb reduction defects is very small
with respect to the number of birth defects in general; thus it is
difficult to amass sufficient data on Bendectin and limb reduc-
tion alone.55
In inferring causation from Bendectin studies in DeLuca,
Dr. Done used a technique, advocated by Dr. Kenneth Rothman
of the University of Massachusetts Medical School, that places
diminished weight on significance testing." Dr. Rothman con-
tends that the .05 level is an arbitrary and conservative conven-
tion of epidemiology and that there may be a strong correlation
between exposure and disease incidence without a finding of sta-
tistical significance.17 He also contends that it is much more
likely that the true incidence rate of the population falls toward
the center of the confidence interval, rather than near the outer
limits.5" Thus, his approach focuses on the position of the whole
confidence interval in relation to the relative risk, as opposed to
focusing on the ends of the interval. Dr. Rothman advocates us-
ing several different confidence intervals, rather than just one.""
Dr. Rothman also contends that his approach is more accu-
rate than the traditional model in analyzing the results of more
than one study.6 0 Although each individual study may fail to at-
FDA was about to require Merrell Dow to disclose these findings in the official Bendectin
labeling. However, on June 9, 1983, the company ceased production and distribution of
the drug, claiming that the burden of marketing it had become too heavy because of the
costs of defending about 300 lawsuits. At the same time, the company stated that there
was no doubt as to the drug's safety. The FDA then requested that Merrell Dow send
warning letters to doctors informing them of the studies for the benefit of those still
using Bendectin. After the company refused, citing a third study with a larger database
that showed no association with pyloric stenosis, the FDA alerted the nation's doctors
itself. The agency included this third study in its bulletin, which emphasized that the
available information could neither confirm nor disprove an association between Bendec-
tin and the stomach defect. Morton Mintz, FDA to Study Morning Sickness' Drug Link
to Birth Defects, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23, 1980, at A7.
55 According to an acting director of the FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, to
establish a link between a drug and a specific birth defect, a study sample of many
thousands of pregnant women is necessary (as opposed to several hundred for a "good
study"). Michael De Courcy Hinds, FDA May Warn on Drugs in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMM,
Aug. 28, 1982, at A12.
DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 946.
57 ROTHAN, supra note 39; Kenneth J. Rothman, A Show of Confidence, Nsw EF.NG.
J. Man., December 14, 1978, at 1362.
DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 946.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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tain significance, when viewed together, they may indicate a
moderate or strong correlation between exposure and disease. 1
This way, Dr. Rothman argues, the risk of type II error (false
negative) is not as high as it is for significance testing at the .05
level.62 Also, by varying the size of the confidence interval, the
researcher can adjust the study to better suit the type of deci-
sion being made and balance the risks of type I (false positive)
and type II error.6 3
Dr. Done's testimony relied on several studies, including one
conducted by Merrell Dow.6 4 He claimed to have found several
errors in the method used to collect the data.", He also claimed
to have corrected these errors and to have compiled data from
all published studies on Bendectin and birth defects as well as
data from several unpublished studies. Thus Dr. Done's
database was broader than that of any other study. He also
claimed to rely on the same data that Merrell Dow's experts
(and the FDA) relied on in forming their opinions.66 Using Dr.
Rothman's approach to analyze these data, Dr. Done did not
find significance at the .05 level, but found he could reject the
null hypothesis at the .1 level (90% confidence interval). 7 He
concluded that the "bulk of the available human epidemiological
data . . . are indicative of Bendectin's human teratogenicity." s
II. THE BENDECTIN CASE LAW
In considering the probative value of expert testimony prof-
fered by Bendectin plaintiffs, most appellate courts have de-
cided to look beneath the expert opinions and examine their un-
derlying reasoning.6 9 This is a departure from the traditional
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1107 (D.C. 1986).
65 Id. That study, conducted by Drs. Bunde and Bowles--employees of Merrell
Dow-used data from obstetricians on pairs of their female patients in Canada and the
United States.
:1 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 948.
67 Id.
"6 Id. at 948-49 (quoting from appellant's brief). Dr. Done did not "quantify the
increased risk for limb reduction defects," but he contended that the association of
Bendectin with birth defects was strongest for, among other defects, limb reduction de-
fects like Amy DeLuca's. Id. at 949.
6 See Ealy, 897 F.2d 1159; Brock, 874 F.2d 307; Richardson, 857 F.2d 823; Lynch,
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approach where courts would allow expert testimony without ju-
dicial scrutiny as long as the experts' qualifications as physicians
were established and the experts expressed "reasonable medical
certainty" in their opinions.70
A. The Traditional Approach: The Ferebee Standard
An illustration of the traditional approach 1 is Oxendine v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2 In Oxendine the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") by the court below, holding that Dr.
Done's epidemiological evidence taken together with his other
causation evidence was sufficient for a jury's finding of causa-
tion." The court noted that "Dr. Done's methodology was gener-
ally accepted in the field of teratology, and his qualifications as
an expert have not been challenged, '1 4 citing Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co.7 5 Ferebee stands for the proposition that:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to re-
solve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt
to link low level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On
questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical
and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such
a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testi-
mony .... The case was thus a classic battle of the experts, a battle in
830 F.2d 1190.
70 Black, supra note 30, at 659-62.
71 See also Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1986 WL 7832 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
16 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
73As in DeLuca, the three other types of evidence presented were in vivo and in
vitro studies, as well as structure activity analysis. Without epidemiological studies,
these types of evidence are generally not considered to provide a sound basis for a find-
ing of causation in the scientific community. Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110.
A similar result was reached in In re Bendectin, 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(opinion written by Judge Carl Rubin, who also wrote the opinion in In re Richardson-
Merrell, 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), the consolidated class action), Ramirez v.
Richardson-Merrell, No. 85-1504, 1986 WL 9724 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1986) and Lanzflotti,
No. 82-0183 1986 WL 7832 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1986). Those courts found a division in the
scientific community as to whether epidemiological evidence is the only type that can
support a conclusion of causation. Thus they held that an expert could reasonably rely
on other types of evidence and the jury would have to decide on the credibility and
weight of the testimony. In re Bendectin, 732 F. Supp. at 749; Ramirez at "3; Lanzilotti
at *2.
U Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110.
75 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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which the jury must decide the victor .7
Ferebee involved an agricultural worker who was exposed to
the chemical paraquat on the job." He alleged that as a result
he subsequently contracted pulmonary fibrosis-a disease from
which he later died.78 His two treating physicians testified to
causation on the basis of their own examination of him and
medical studies they felt suggested that paraquat may cause
chronic injury of the type afflicting Ferebee .7  The defendant ar-
gued that while paraquat was known to be acutely toxic, there
was no evidence linking it to chronic disease upon which the
plaintiff's treating physicians could legitimately base an opinion
of causation.80 In appealing the trial court's denial of j.n.o.v., the
defendant argued that "the jury was obligated to reject" Fer-
ebee's theory of causation."1 The court of appeals distinguished
between an expert's methodology and an expert's conclusion,
7' Thus, a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or
epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a
relationship exists. As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a
conclusion is sound, such as use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient
examination, products liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statisti-
cally significant" number of people have been injured or until science has had
the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the
chemical. In a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort
suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable
jurors could conclude from the expert testimony that paraquat more likely
than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that another jury might reach the
opposite conclusion or that science would require more evidence before conclu-
sively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant. That Ferebee's
case may have been the first of its exact type, or that his doctors may have
been the first alert enough to recognize such a case, does not mean that the
testimony of those doctors, who are concededly well qualified in their fields,
should not have been admitted.
Id. at 1534-35. See also Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1104, 1110.
7 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532.
" Id. at 1533. When Ferebee died before trial, his estate continued with a survival
action and a wrongful death count was added on behalf of his minor children. Id. at
1532.
79 Id. at 1533.
60 Id. at 1535. However, the court noted that "[t]he dose-response relationship at
low levels of exposure for admittedly toxic chemicals like paraquat is one of the most
sharply contested questions currently being debated in the medical community ...
surely it would be rash for a court to declare as a matter of law that, below a certain
threshold level of exposure, dermal absorption of paraquat has no detrimental effect."
Id. at 1536 (citing James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Envi-
ronmental Carcinogens, 4 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 86, 100-03 (1980)).
81 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535.
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holding that only the methodology must be generally accepted in
the scientific community. 2 Thus the testimony of Ferebee's
treating physicians was sufficient to support the jury verdict for
the plaintiff. 3 This approach has been dubbed "passive accept-
ance" by one commentator.8 4
The Oxendine court credited the testimony of Dr. Shanna
Swan, an expert in biostatistics and epidemiology, offered by the
plaintiff to rebut Merrell Dow's contention that statistical signif-
icance at the .05 level was necessary for a finding of causation in
epidemiological studies.8 5 The court also found that Dr. Done's
use of in vivo and in vitro studies, chemical structure analysis
and epidemiological studies in determining causation were "gen-
erally accepted in the field of teratology." 8 Finally, the court
noted that Dr. Done's qualifications as an expert had not been
challenged and stressed that "[a]lthough he was vigorously and
exhaustively cross-examined by very able counsel, [Dr. Done]
did not waiver from his opinion that Bendectin had caused ap-
pellant's birth defects.18 7 Although the epidemiological studies
that Dr. Done relied upon did not report significant results at
Id. The court stated that expert testimony could be controversial in its conclu-
sions as long as it was based on "well-founded methodologies." Id. The methods the
treating physicians used to diagnose Ferebee's illness were sound. However, their ability
to determine the cause of Ferebee's pulmonary fibrosis by a medical examination was
much more questionable. See Black, supra note 30, at 671-72.
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536.
4 Black, supra note 30, at 671. This "passive acceptance' approach was also ac-
cepted by the Eleventh Circuit in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 783 F.2d 741
(11th Cir. 1986). In Wells the plaintiff alleged that her use of defendant's spermicide
during the first four weeks of her pregnancy caused birth defects in her child. Plaintiff's
experts testified to causation on the basis of their expertise in the field, personal exami-
nations of the child and medical and scientific studies. The epidemiological studies they
relied on did not warrant any strong conclusions as to causation: they merely indicated
the possibility. The defendant argued that stronger epidemiological proof was necesary
for plaintiff's expert testimony to support a finding of causation by the trial court (the
parties waived a jury). The Eleventh Circuit, citing Ferebee, held that, as a "battle of the
experts," it was within the fact finder's province to determine the credibility of the wit-
nesses and "decide the victor." Id. at 745 (citing Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535).
" Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1109. The court held that since there was conflicting ex-
pert testimony on the necessity of .05 significance for a finding of causation, the issue
"was properly left to the jury to resolve." Id. Accord Lanzilofti t,. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 1986 WL 7832 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("We believe that based solely on the
testimony regarding the epidemiological studies, and the inferences that could be drawn
therefrom, reasonable minds could disagree as to the teratogenicity of Bendectin.").
" Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110.
Id. at 1108.
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the .05 level, his testimony was still sufficient to support a ver-
dict for the plaintiff.88
B. Criticism of the Ferebee Standard
The Ferebee line of cases has been criticized by several
commentators for allowing experts to testify to almost anything
they wish, no matter how unscientific.89 First, these critics fear
that "an expert can be found to support almost any position"9' 0
and that, under the traditional approach, "courts cannot consist-
ently and rationally resolve disputes about expert medical testi-
mony.""1 Second, commentators note that unsubstantiated ex-
pert testimony coupled with the presence of toxic tort victims,
who make very sympathetic plaintiffs in the courtroom, may
work great prejudice against defendant drug manufacturers. 2
Others fear that the Ferebee standard has "the effect of turning
over to doctors most of the decisions about legal sufficiency that
68 Id. Three years after judgment was entered in Oxendine, Dr. Done was accused of
misrepresenting his credentials during the Oxendine trial. The district court granted
Merrell Dow's motion to vacate the judgment of Oxendine I and ordered a new trial. On
appeal the court in Oxendine II, 563 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1989), found that Dr. Done had
testified falsely that he was a faculty member of the medical school at Wayne State
University as of May 1983; in fact, he had resigned before that date. But the court also
held that information did not affect Dr. Done's qualification as an expert and that his
standing in the medical community was still impressive. Therefore the misrepresentation
was not material and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals once again reinstated
the verdict.
89 See Black, supra note 30, at 671-74, 677-81; Peter Huber, Safety and the Second
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
333 (1985); Morning Sickness, Legal Miscarriage, N.Y. Timxs, July 30, 1984, at A20 (edi-
torial); Weinstein, supra note 50. See also Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986) (the district court criticized the Oxendine decision because it
"judicially reopened an esoteric twenty-year-old controversy which is by now essentially
settled within the scientific community.").
9' Black, supra note 30, at 597-98 (quoting Huber, supra note 89 and Weinstein,
supra note 50, at 482).
91 Black, supra note 30, at 669.
As the Lynch court noted: "The sight of a helpless mutilated youngster may
evoke emotion along with the corresponding wish to make somebody pay for his or her
plight. Judge Rubin has observed that the presence of handicapped youngsters could
render a jury 'unable to arrive at an unbiased judgement.' In re Richardson-Merrell, 624
F. Supp. at 1224. With this very real possibility of runaway emotion overcoming judg-
ment, the district court's firm rejection here of foundationless expert testimony was nec-
essary. . ." Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d at 1196. The court in In re Rich-
ardson-Merrell, 624 F. Supp. at 1222, excluded crippled minor plaintiffs from the
courtroom against the plaintiffs' protest.
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courts should make."9'
Finally, critics argue that the unpredictable jury verdicts
which can arise where scientific testimony is admitted without
regard for a uniform acceptance standard may also have a chil-
ling effect on the pharmaceutical industry.8 ' Critics point to
manufacturers that have pulled useful drugs off the market for
fear of tort liability and stopped research and development in
the particular field.9 5
C. Active Review: Implicit And Explicit Adoption of the Frye
Standard
A number of courts faced with novel issues of causation in
toxic tort cases have foregone the traditional approach and have
scrutinized the reasoning of scientific experts before admitting
their testimony.9 " Many of the Bendectin courts that have taken
93 Black, supra note 30, at 670.
m See Brock v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d at 307, 309-10 (5th Cir.
1989).
Under the traditional approach to scientific evidence, courts would not peer
beneath the reasoning of medical experts to question their reasoning. Con-
fronted, as we now are, with difficult medical questions, courts must critically
evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts connect data to their con.
clusions in order for courts to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes
before them. Moreover, in mass torts the same issue is often presented over
and over to juries in different cases, and the juries often split both ways on the
issue. The effect of this is to create a state of uncertainty among manufacturers
contemplating the research and development of new, and potentially life-sav-
ing drugs. Appellate courts, if they take the lead in resolving those questions
upon which juries will go both ways, can reduce some of the uncertainty which
can tend to produce a sub-optimal amount of new drug development.
Id. See also Omibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 133 CONG. Rnc. S10121-091 (daily
ed. July 17, 1987)(report of Sen. McConnell) ("Development of new drugs is diminishing
as product liability cases grow.").
I' See Malcolm Gladwell, U.S. Firms Abandoning Birth Control Industry in Wake
of Lawsuits, WASH. PosT, May 1, 1988, at JI; Product Liability and U.S. Competiti'e-
ness, 134 CONG. RmC. E3003-01 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1988)(statement of Rep. Roth) ("One
third of the companies surveyed have cancelled introduction of new products because of
liability concerns").
" See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 783 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("It simply is not sufficient to point to an individual and show that he was exposed
to Agent Orange and had a cancer."). See also In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374,
415 (D. Kan. 1984) ("[The experts'] conclusions are not supported by any fact other than
that the instruments are coated with a radioactive paint and each plaintiff has cancer
.... This court is disappointed with the apparent fact that these so-called experts can
take such license from the witness stand; these witnesses say and conclude things which,
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this "active review '97 approach cite Judge Weinstein's opinions
in the Agent Orange litigation.""
The Agent Orange litigation involved a class action by Viet-
nam War veterans who claimed that their exposure to the herbi-
cide during the war caused them injury and caused birth defects
in their children. 9 Judge Weinstein approved a settlement be-
tween plaintiffs and the manufacturing chemical companies, in
part, because he found that plaintiffs would not meet their bur-
den on the causation issue.100 In dismissing the cases of those
plaintiffs who had opted out of the class action for failing to pro-
vide prima facie evidence of causation, Judge Weinstein noted
the lack of statistically significant findings of causation in any
Agent Orange epidemiological study and the defects in the
methodology of plaintiffs' expert witnesses.10 1 Although the epi-
demiological studies done on Agent Orange and dioxin (the ac-
tive ingredient) did not confirm the plaintiffs' allegations,
neither did they refute them.10 2
Judge Weinstein recognized that the evidence provided by
the plaintiffs supported the need for further research, but found
that the evidence, at best, left the causation issue open. 10 3 He
also noted that a definitive study of Agent Orange was under-
way, but its results would not be available in time for the litiga-
tion.104 "Courts cannot, unfortunately, wait indefinitely until all
in the Court's view, they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed format.").
97 This approach was dubbed "active review" by Bert Black. See Black, supra note
30, at 674.
98 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 782-95, Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1230-63;
Lilley v. Dow Chemical Co., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
:' Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 746-48.
100 Id.
101 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1232-34. Judge Weinstein relied primarily on the
Ranch Hand study on Agent Orange, conducted by the U.S. Air Force. Id. at 1232, 1241.
He found "[t]he fact that the federal government was a defendant in related Agent Or-
ange cases does not suggest a motive for untrustworthiness by the independent govern-
ment scientists who conducted the studies." Id. at 1241. But see Nesson, supra, note 47,
at 538. (suggesting that the Ranch Hand study may have been biased and criticizing
Judge Weinstein for ignoring this problem, instead of basing "his reliance on the Air
Force study with a similar study by the Australian Government, which had a similar
problem with its men in Vietnam.").
102 Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. at 1232; Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 795.
103 Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 795.
104 Id. at 782; Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1232-33. This study was to be under-
taken by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"). Judge Weinstein noted that
"[a]ssuming that the study was started in December, 1983 as planned ... if all goes well
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scientists have completed their long term studies. They must de-
cide on information now available."' 0 5 The court distinguished
the Agent Orange cases before it from Ferebee, claiming that
Ferebee's treating physicians "were relatively certain of the
cause of his disease and no epidemiological proof was neces-
sary," because no such studies existed.106 By contrast, in the
Agent Orange litigation, "no competent particularistic evidence
has been presented and the relevant epidemiologic evidence is
negative."'1 7
The approach taken by Judge Weinstein involved an im-
plicit adoption of the "general acceptance" test promulgated by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Frye v. United States.10 8 In Frye the defendant,
charged with murder, sought to introduce a systolic blood pres-
sure deception test (a precursor of the polygraph test)100 to help
prove his innocence.110 The deception test was relatively new at
that time. Because it was a novel scientific technique that was
not "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs," ' the court held the
results inadmissible.11 2
it will be available in mid-1989." Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 782. But all did not go
well, and the study was abandoned because of difficulties in determining exposure. Phil-
lip M. Boffey, Lack of Military Data Halts Agent Orange Study, N.Y. Tesna, Sept. 1,
1987, at Al.
101 Agent "Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 782.
108 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1261-62.
107 Id.
108 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242, 1261.
19 It was based on the theory that conscious deception or concealment of guilt and
fear of detection during examination raise the systolic blood pressure. Frye, 293 F.2d at
1013.
110 Id.
2 Id. at 1014.
1"I Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accept-
ance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. Years after the conviction, another person confessed to the murder. McConRumCi,
supra note 27, at 606 n.5.
It is unclear whether the "thing from which the deduction is made" in Frye is the
actual testing device, the theory of deception and blood pressure on which it is based, or
the conclusion reached by the test. This is one of the problems with the application of
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The rationale behind the "general acceptance" test is that
"[a] courtroom is not a research laboratory" and "should not be
used as a testing ground for theories supported neither by prior
control experiments nor by calculations with indicia of reliabil-
ity." '113 Like Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation,
many of the Bendectin courts have also implicitly adopted the
Frye test.114 Courts granting summary judgment to Merrell Dow
have neither characterized Dr. Done's approach as a "novel sci-
entific technique" nor cited Frye.115 Yet their rejection of Dr.
Done's testimony for his reliance on studies that did not attain
significance at the .05 level implicitly accepts the Frye "general
acceptance" standard." 6 These courts assumed that since most
experts in the field of epidemiology would not rely on Dr. Done's
analysis (or on studies not significant at .05), the testimony was,
therefore, not properly admissible as evidence of causation.1"
Courts excluding Dr. Done's testimony determined, in effect,
that the scientific community-and not the court-is best quali-
fied to establish a threshold in inferring causation from test
results.
The District of Columbia circuit court espoused such a view
in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc."" The Richardson
court noted that no published study found a statistically signifi-
cant correlation between Bendectin and the type of birth defects
the Frye test that have emerged over the years. For criticism of Frye, see McCoRMICK
supra note 27, at 605-07; Black, supra note 30, at 629-31; Paul C. Giannelli, The Admis-
sibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1208-21 (1980); Marc S. Klein, Expert Testimony in Pharmaceuti-
cal Product Liability Actions, 45 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 393, 421-22. Many courts hold
that it also applies to scientific techniques for analyzing data as well as forensic evidence.
See Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (applying the
Frye test to the use of the Mantel/Haenszel cohort analysis, "a recognized and generally
accepted method of analyzing a stratified epidemiological data."); Agent Orange, 611 F.
Supp. at 1261 (explaining the interpretation of the Frye rule in Ferebee: "The question
is not whether the opinion itself is accepted in the relevant community, but instead
whether the technique is. Inference from examination and testing, the court found, is
clearly an accepted methodology.").
113 Klein, supra note 112, at 421.
114 Martin, supra note 21, at 4.
11 Id.
Id.
1 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
's 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "The question whether Bendectin causes limb re-
duction defects is scientific in nature, and it is to the scientific community that the law
must look for the answer." Id. at 829.
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at issue in the case. The court also mentioned Dr. Done's conces-
sion that significance at the .05 level was necessary to make a
valid scientific conclusion as to causation. Moreover, he con-
ceded that the studies he rejected and reanalyzed were pub-
lished in peer-reviewed scientific journals, while his own recalcu-
lations were not. "" The court then distinguished Richardson
from its previous decision in Ferebee, stressing that the Ferebee
standard applied only "when the causation issue is novel and
'stands at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological in-
quiry'. ' 120 According to the Richardson court, Bendectin had
been extensively studied and thus the causation issue was far
from the "frontier" of epidemiological inquiry.121 The court then
upheld the district court's grant of j.n.o.v. in Merrell Dow's favor
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.122
The District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its position two
years later in Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.'2 3 The Ealy court
cited Richardson extensively, again distinguishing Ferebee on
the grounds that an overwhelming body of Bendectin research
existed and that every study failed to establish causation. 2' The
11 Id. at 829-31.
120 Id. at 832 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534).
121 Id. "Uniquely to this case, the law now has the benefit of twenty years of scien-
tific study, and the published results must be given their just due." Id. "When such
[epidemiological] studies are available and relevant, and particularly when they are nu-
merous and span a significant period of time, they assume a very important role in deter-
minations of questions of causation." Id. at 830. The court discounted the relevancy of
the three other types of evidence Dr. Done based his opinion on by noting they cannot
prove causation in humans "in the face of the overwhelming body of contradictory epide-
miological evidence." Id.
In Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), the
court took a different view, concluding that the 35 epidemiological studies it reviewed
did not provide conclusive evidence to either support or refute a connection between
Bendectin and birth defects. The court felt that these studies lacked sufficient power due
to their small sample sizes. It granted summary judgment in favor of Merrell Dow, citing
the plaintiff's failure to produce conclusive evidence of causation.
1 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 824.
12 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
2' The court also quoted from In re Agent Orange stating that: "When the expert's
...testimony lie[s] at the periphery of what the scientific community considers accept-
able, special care should be exercised in evaluating the reliability and probative worth of
the proffered testimony under Rules 703 and 403." Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1162 (quoting In re
Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242). The Ealy court went on "Unlike the circumstances
of Ferebee, the body of published epidemiological opinions on the subject at hand is
extensive, indeed massive, and all such opinions point to the same conclusion." Id. at
1162. The court summed up Richardson and the case at hand as follow.: "[U]nder Rule
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court also provided an explanation for the discrepancy between
the findings of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Ox-
endine and its own findings in Richardson and Ealy; Oxendine
was decided in 1983 and between that time and the Richardson
decision in 1986, two large epidemiological studies had been
published, concluding that no relation existed between Bendec-
tin and birth defects. 12 5 The Ealy court concluded by recogniz-
ing that future research may generate adequate epidemiological
proof of causation but, until then, an expert opinion refuting the
well-established scientific consensus would be inadmissible.12
The First Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Lynch v.
Merrell National Laboratories.2 7 That court noted that studies
on Bendectin's teratogenicity began in 1963 and that in over
twenty years of research, "[n]o correlation, much less a causal
connection, has been demonstrated between the use of Bendec-
tin and limb reduction."' 2 The Lynch court urged caution in
allowing expert testimony on causation in a field like birth de-
fects and stated that only a new (statistically significant) study
challenging the consensus would be admissible evidence. 29
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals5 0 the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not hold the testimony of plaintiff's expert (Dr. Glasser)
inadmissible, but found it insufficient to support a jury verdict
for the plaintiff.13i The court advocated active review for testi-
mony on the causation issue. The Brock court noted that such
testimony fosters unpredictable outcomes in jury trials, which,
in turn, has a chilling effect on research and development of po-
tentially helpful new drugs. 32 Like the Richardson court, the
Brock court noted that the expert's conclusions had not been
703, an opinion refuting this scientific consensus is inadmissible for lack of an adequate
foundation, in the absence of other substantial probative evidence on which to base this
opinion. It is this uncontroversial rule that is the ratio decidendi of Richardson and this
case." Id. at 1162.
225 Id.
128 Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1163-64.
127 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
128 Id. at 1194.
229 Id.
130 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
"I Id. Although the Brock court reversed the verdict on a sufficiency basis, "the
underlying issue was really one of the admissibility of the experts' testimony." Martin,
supra note 21, at 4.
12 Id. at 310. See supra note 94.
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subject to peer review.13 Although the court explicitly avoided
holding that studies must be published to be admissible, the
court, quoting Richardson, stated that "the examination of a sci-
entific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its exami-
nation by others trained in the field of science or medicine."' 3 '
More recently, two circuits have explicitly adopted the Frye
rule in passing on the admissibility of expert causation testi-
mony. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.235 the
Ninth Circuit applied the general acceptance test in a particu-
larly rigid fashion. The Daubert court held that an expert's
methodology must meet all the essential requirements imposed
by the scientific community. Accordingly, the court excluded
plaintiff's causation evidence because it was generated solely for
use in litigation and was not published or subjected to the nor-
mal peer review process.1 36
In Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp.3 7 the Fifth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's exclusion of the
plaintiff's expert testimony on the causation of colon cancer
(small cell carcinoma) by exposure to nickel and cadmium
fumes. Exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes had been linked
to small cell carcinoma of the lungs and other organs by epide-
miological studies, but not to small cell carcinoma of the colon.
Citing Frye, the Christopherson court required traditional proof
23 Id. at 313.
11 Id. (quoting Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831).
... 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
13' The court stated that "the best test of certainty we have is good science-the
science of publication, replication and verification, the science of consensus and peer
review." Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131, citing PETER HUBEsR, GALUo's RLETENGI JuNK SCI-
ENCE IN THE COURTHOUSE 228 (1991).
There is disagreement on whether the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
intended to abandon the Frye test. There is no mention of it in the Rules. This has been
interpreted both ways: "Probably the general scientific acceptance approach has survived
the enactment of the Federal Rules, and will continue to be applied in determining the
relevancy of such proof under Rule 401." DAvID W. LoUsrs.r & CHRISroPE B. MUEL-
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 818. Accord SEHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. RED-
DEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 452 (3d ed. 1982). But see JAcK B. WEINsTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTmN ON EVIDENCE § 3, at 702-36 (1992)('IThe silence of
the rule [702] and its drafters should be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of
the general acceptance standard."). Accord C. WMsGrr & K GRAHAts, 22 FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 86-90 (1978). Many federal courts have rejected the Frye
test. WEiNTsmN & BERGE, supra, §§ 702-36 to 702-37 n.6; McCo!MucK, supra note 27, at
606-07 n.23.
-- 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
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(i.e., epidemiological studies, animal testing or in vitro studies)
of a link between the exposure and Christopherson's particular
disease before allowing the plaintiff's expert to testify on
causation.
In doing so, it reversed the Fifth Circuit's previous holding
in Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp.138 that limited the re-
quirement of positive epidemiological studies to the Bendectin
cases, but failed to require such proof for all toxic tort cases.
Since there had been no studies testing the link between expo-
sure to nickel and cadmium fumes and small cell carcinoma in
particular, the plaintiff could not meet this requirement. Conse-
quently the court denied his motion for summary judgment.
The Christopherson opinion mentioned in a footnote that
an expert opinion which is controversial or unique may still be
admissible under the general acceptance test if it is supported
by meaningful information."' 9 The court noted that "scientific
truth has not so completely hardened as to prevent legitimate
difference of true expert opinion in a particular concrete con-
text."' 40 However, the Christopherson court dismissed the plain-
tiff's expert's theory of causation as mere speculation. The dis-
sent objected, arguing that knowledge, through traditional
methods, on the relationship between nickel, cadmium and small
cell carcinoma was scant and that "the causation issue [was]
plainly not sufficiently investigated to warrant summary pro-
ceedings based on direct judicial precedent."''
D. Criticism of the General Acceptance Test
Supporters of "active review" argue that by stressing publi-
cation and peer review for scientific findings, courts more effec-
tively guarantee the validity and accuracy of an expert's conclu-
sions.'42 They further argue that conclusions reported by an
epidemiologist in a research context are much less susceptible to
bias than those testified to in a litigation context."43 Many com-
138 Id. at 1135.
"I Id. at 1106.
10 Id. at 1134.
141 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1123 (citing Ferebee) (Reaveley, J., dissenting).
142 See Black, supra note 30, at 677-81; Kreiling, supra note 27, at 970.
14S "An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no
matter how frivolous . . . Juries and judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the
expert-for-hire." Weinstein, supra note 50, at 482. "Today practicing lawyers can locate
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mentators agree that "the examination of a scientific study by a
cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others
trained in the field of science or medicine." 144
The "general acceptance" test has come under attack, how-
ever, for adopting the conservative, rigorous standards of science
that tend to impose a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs.145 In
particular, this argument has been directed at the use of statisti-
cal significance as a threshold for proof in the legal setting.146
Some argue that the legal standard of proof is different than the
scientific standard."4 At least one commentator has argued that
the balance between type I (false positive) and type H (false
negative) error in a significance test at the .05 level conflicts
with the preponderance of evidence standard in civil cases. 8
Another argument leveled against the "general acceptance"
test is that it should not be applied when there are insufficient
quickly and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly anything the lawyers desire."
Michael A. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rule of Evidence: In-
suring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL L Rnv. 43, 45. However,
research scientists may not be completely immune from charges of bias. Allegations that
some scientists slant their experiments to obtain results that are publishable have led to
recent congressional inquiry. See HousE CoML ON Gov'T OPERMATONs, Anm ScmN-mr'c
MISCONDUCT AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST HAzARwous To OUR HEA'T? HILR. Rep. No.
688, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
1" Richardson v. Richardson Merrell Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 831 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quoting from Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985)). Several com-
mentators have called for upholding scientific standards in the court. See Black, supra
note 30; Huber, supra note 89; Weinstein, supra note 50.
'" See McComCK, supra note 27, at 608 ("'General scientific acceptance' is a
proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts but not a criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence.").
"I See McCoRMUCK, supra note 27, at 648-49.
One problem with [the use of significance testing] in court is the tendency of
some expert witnesses or judges to assume that because there is an arbitrary
convention of insisting on [significance] of .05 or less before labelling scientific
findings "statistically significant," this same number should be required before
the factfinder may rely on the quantitative results .... It is not the statistic
that directly states how large the observed underrepresentation is. It is merely
one measure of the probative force of statistical evidence, and an incomplete
measure at that.
Id. See also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 736 n.8; Kaye, supra note 36; David H.
Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAw & Conmuap.
PROBS. 13 (1983); Cohen, supra note 39, at 409-17.
14? Cohen, supra note 39, at 412-17; Kaye, supra note 33, at 1345; Nesson, supra
note 47, at 529-32; Black, supra note 30, at 677-79. See also Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
"I Kaye, supra note 146.
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data to accept or reject the null hypothesis with any degree of
certainty.14 One commentator criticized Judge Weinstein's deci-
sion to dismiss the cases of the opt-out plaintiffs in the Agent
Orange litigation: Judge Weinstein dismissed these cases for fail-
ure to provide proof of causation, yet acknowledged that the epi-
demiological evidence indicated the need for further research,
not the absence of causation. 150
In its decisions in Ferebee and Richardson the District of
Columbia Circuit also recognized the potential unfairness to
plaintiffs when the causation issue is novel and the proof that
exists is insufficient for scientific purposes. The Ferebee court
held that "products liability law does not preclude recovery until
a 'statistically significant' number of people have been injured or
until science has had the time and resources to complete sophis-
ticated laboratory studies of the chemical."1 51 The Richardson
court distinguished Ferebee as applying only to cases in which
the causation issue is novel and "at the frontier of epidemiologi-
cal inquiry.1' 52 The Richardson court therefore excluded the ex-
pert testimony offered, finding that Bendectin had been exten-
sively studied and was neither novel nor at the frontier of
epidemiological inquiry. The Richardson court also specified
that published epidemiological studies assume an important role
in the causation issue when they are "numerous and span a sig-
nificant period of time.' ' 53
III. THE DeLuca OPINION
A. The District Court Decision
The district court excluded Dr. Done's testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), holding that it did not meet
"the foundational requirements of Fed. R. of Evid. 703.' 1 4 Fed-
149 See Nesson, supra note 47, at 529-32.
150 Id.
151 Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical, 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
I" Richardson v. Richardson-MerreU,Inc. 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
'5' 857 F.2d at 830.
z DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 131 F.R.D. 71, 72, (D.N.J. 1989), 911
F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). The court cited other Bendectin cases in which summary judg-
ment or j.n.o.v. was granted in favor of Merrell Dow, two of which involved testimony by
Dr. Done himself. Id. at 73.
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) covers questions of admissibility. It states:
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eral Rule of Evidence 703 addresses the admissability of data
upon which testimony by experts is based."'s The DeLuca court
explained that Dr. Done had not come forward with any new
evidence of Bendectin's teratogenicity. Moreover, the court
noted Dr. Done had conceded that the scientific community gen-
erally agreed that Bendectin does not cause birth defects.1 6 It
also explained that the epidemiological studies Dr. Done used
failed to link Bendectin to limb reduction and that the other
types of studies he relied on (i.e., in vivo, in vitro and chemical
structure analysis) were "merely screening tests with no conclu-
sive weight."157 The court also mentioned that Dr. Done was not
an epidemiologist. I5 8 Thus the DeLuca court concluded that his
testimony contravened Rule 703 because it was not based on evi-
dence reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field.1 59 Having excluded the DeLuca's sole causation evidence,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of Merrell Dow. °
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witnecs,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be deter-
mined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with re-
spect to privileges.
FED. ItL EviD. 104(a).
15 Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
The rule was designed to allow experts to base their opinions on data like epidemio-
logical studies that are considered hearsay and thus are inadmissible at trial. Before Rule
703, experts could only base their opinions on facts of which they had personal knowl-
edge and facts in the trial records. WEmsrniN & BERGER supra note 136, §§ 703-5 to 6
(1992).
20 DeLuca, 131 F.R.D. at 74.
157 Id.
15 Id.
159 Id. According to the Third Circuit, Rule 703, in conjunction with Rule 104(a),
requires the court to "make a factual inquiry. . . as to what data experts in the field
find reliable," and "[t]he proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what
experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be." In re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S.
574 (1986). See also WEIsmIs & BERGER, supra note 136, §§ 703[03], 703-24-703-25.
150 DeLuca, 131 F.R.D. at 74.
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B. The Third Circuit Decision
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's holding on
Rule 703.161 The court noted that although Dr. Done was not an
epidemiologist, Merrell Dow had conceded that he was qualified
to interpret epidemiological studies. 6 2 The court then found
that Dr. Done relied on the same data relied on by Merrell
Dow's experts-Dr. Done merely came to a different conclu-
sion.'63 The DeLuca court distinguished between the data ex-
perts rely upon and the inferences they draw from the data,
holding that Rule 703 only applied to the former. 64 Moreover,
the court held that an expert need not accept the conclusion of a
study to use the underlying data as a basis for testimony.16
Thus Dr. Done's testimony was based on data reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field."6 6
According to the Third Circuit, the inquiry into experts'
qualifications and the methodology they use in drawing conclu-
sions from data are properly governed by Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702.167 Rule 702 deals with the admissibility of expert tes-
timony in general.16
8
101 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 952-54 (3d Cir. 1990).
101 Id. at 952.
163 Id.
10' Rule 703 is satisfied once there is a showing that an expert's testimony is
based on the type of data a reasonable expert in the field would use in render-
ing an opinion on the subject at issue; it does not address the reliability or
general acceptance of an expert's methodology. When a statistician refers to a
study as 'not statistically significant,' he is not making a statement about the
reliability of the data used, rather he is making a statement about the propri-
ety of drawing a particular inference from that data .... He is making a
statement about the degree to which the relationship found in the data may be
due to chance, but his decision to use a certain significance level as a check on
the permissible inference to be drawn from the data is a methodological value
judgment which is separate from the question of whether the data is of the
type an expert would rely upon.
Id at 953.
105 "[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence contain no requirement that an expert's testi-
mony be based upon reasoning subjected to peer-review and published in the profes-
sional literature." Id. In In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),
the Third Circuit reaffirmed this part of the holding.
10 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954.
'07 Id. at 954-57.
16$ Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
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After briefly discussing epidemiology and the decisions of
other Bendectin courts on the admissibility and weight of Dr.
Done's testimony, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the gen-
eral acceptance test and substituted its own formulation from
United States v. Downing.6 9 In doing so, it characterized Dr.
Done's analysis as a "novel scientific technique. '17 0
In Downing the Third Circuit held that the trial court erred
in excluding defendant's expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony by not considering its helpfulness under
Rule 702.171 The Downing court set out a three-part test for rul-
ing on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Under this
test, the trial court must determine: "(1) the soundness and reli-
ability of the process or technique used in generating the evi-
dence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would
overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered
connection between the scientific research or test result to be
presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the case. ' '172
In DeLuca the Third Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with instructions to consider the admissibility of Dr.
Done's testimony in light of the Downing factors.1 3 The court
169 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). The Downing test uses the "relevancy" approach to
admissibility of evidence, an approach advocated by McCormick, that has been termed
"consistent with the underlying policies" of the Federal Rules of Evidence by Weinstein
and Berger. See McConsucK, supra note 27, at 606-09; WFiusrmN AN BMaGna, supra
note 136, at §§ 702-35 to 41. This approach is considered the rival to the Frye test. See
Black, supra note 30, at 641-44; Kreiling, supra note 27, at 924.
17 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954.
171 U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985). In Downing the defendant
was charged with participating in a scheme to defraud numerous vendors. The partici-
pants attended trade shows, representing themselves as the Universal League of Clergy
("ULC"). They took orders from manufacturers' representatives and gave the represent-
atives a list of supposed credit references that was actually a list of false banhs and
companies with the addresses of mail-drops from which ULC could collect the letter .
After sending the manufacturers positive credit references, the manufacturers shipped
goods to the ULC on credit that disposed of them without making payment.
The government's case against the defendant consisted almost entirely of 12 eyewit-
nesses who testified that the defendant represented himself as Reverend Claymore at the
trade shows on behalf of ULC. The defendant denied representing himself as Reverend
Claymore and asserted that Claymore was the real perpetrator. He sought to introduce
the testimony of a psychologist on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. The district
court held that such expert testimony could never be admisible, but the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded with instructions to consider the "helpfulness" of the testimony
under Rule 702. Id.
172 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
171 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956-57.
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made clear that the lack of statistical significance would be rele-
vant in considering admissibility, but would not, in itself, re-
quire exclusion. 17' Additionally, even if the testimony was to be
admitted, lack of statistical significance would be relevant in
6onsidering the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand sum-
mary judgment. 175 The DeLuca court also noted that the third
prong of the Downing test was satisfied because epidemiological
evidence is closely related to causation.176 Thus the district court
would have to consider only the reliability of the evidence and
jury comprehension issues. 77
The Third Circuit then specified that in a motion for sum-
mnary judgment the calculated relative risk would have to exceed
2.0 to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. 178 The
court also discussed the predominance of the .05 level of signifi-
114 In considering the question of reliability on remand, the district court is
permitted to identify relevant scientific communities and make determinations
about the degree of acceptance of Dr. Done's methodology within those com-
munities. Conversely, it may consider the extent to which members of these
communities decline to give any weight to inferences not supported by .05 sta-
tistical significance. The district court should keep in mind, however, that the
ultimate touchstone is helpfulness to the trier of fact, and with regard to relia-
bility helpfulness turns on whether the expert's technique or principle [is] suf-
ficiently reliable so that expert opinion with somewhat less assurance is not
sufficiently reliable to be helpful in the context of civil litigation.
Id. (citations omitted).
171 "[A]ssuming that New Jersey would apply the traditional 'more probable than
not' burden of proof standard to the causation issue in this case, this admissible testi-
mony would not alone bar summary judgment for Merrell Dow unless it would support a
jury finding that Bendectin more likely than not caused the birth defects in this partic-
ular case" Id. at 958 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). "Even if Dr. Done's
statistical analysis is found to be admissible, its lack of statistical significance at the .05
level may appropriately play some role in deciding this subsequent issue." Id. at 959
n.24.
176 Id. at 955.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 958-59 (quoting from Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434
(W.D. Mo. 1986)). The DeLuca court explained that a relative risk of 2.0 indicates a
doubling of disease incidence after exposure. This would indicate an attributable risk of
50%. Attributable risk is the probability that any person in the population born with
birth defects acquired them because of exposure to the drug as opposed to other (back-
ground) causes. Only if the attributable risk is greater than 50% can it be said that it is
more likely than not that the drug caused harm to any particular plaintiff. Id. See also
Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 767-69.
Attributable risk is the percentage of people in the diseased population who can
attribute their illness to the drug. The probability that any individual in this population
was made ill by the drug (assuming exposure) is directly related to this percentage. See
id. at 760-61, 767-69.
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cance in scientific research.1 9 The court cited Dr. Rothman's
work, 80 noting his contention that "there is nothing magical or
inherently important about .05 significance" and that "the data
in a certain study may indicate a strong relationship between
two variables but still not be 'statistically significant' and that
the level of significance which should be required depends on
the type of decision being made and the relative values placed
on avoiding the two types of risk."181 The Third Circuit also ex-
plained Dr. Rothman's proposal to report the relative risk ratio
and various confidence intervals (e.g., 90%, 95% and 99%), in-
stead of reporting merely whether significance was attained. 82
After devoting a considerable portion of the opinion to the
views of Drs. Done and Rothman, the Third Circuit instructed
the district court to consider the degree to which the relevant
scientific community accepts Dr. Done's methodology.8 3 But the
DeLuca court stressed that "helpfulness to the trier of fact...
in reaching accurate results" was the central consideration and
that even if scientists may require significance, it did not neces-
sarily mean that "expert opinion with somewhat less assurance
is not sufficiently reliable to be helpful in the context of civil
litigation."8 4
C. The DeLuca Remand Decision
On remand the district court held a five-day hearing in ac-
cordance with the principles set forth in the Third Circuit's
1'9 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 947. The court explained the concept of type I and type II
error, and that when statistical significance is set at .05, the risk of type I error is 5%,
while the risk of type 11 error may be as high as 50%. According to the court: '"rype one
error may be viewed here as the risk of concluding that Bendectin is a teratogen when it
is not. Type two error is the risk of concluding that Bendectin is a teratogen when it is
not. Type two error is the risk of concluding that Bendectin is not a teratogen, when it in
fact is." Id. (citing John M. Dawson, Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statisti-
cian, 11 THE FoRUm 896, 907-08 (1976)). See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
The court here was not completely accurate. Type I error is the risk of concluding
Bendectin is a teratogen when the evidence would tend to show no correlation between
the drug and birth defects, and vice-versa. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 411, 413.
180 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 946.
181 Id. at 947.
182 Id. at 948.
" Id. at 956.
1 Id. at 956-57. Here, in a footnote, the court drew a distinction between what is
helpful in a civil versus a criminal context but declined to pursue the topic any further.
Id. at 957 n.20.
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DeLuca and Downing decisions. It excluded Dr. Done's testi-
mony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.111 The
opinion contained an extensive critique of Dr. Done's expert tes-
timony. Noting Dr. Done's failure both to consider the weight of
6xisting epidemiological studies and to weigh more heavily the
studies with larger sample sizes, the court found his methodol-
ogy lacking indicia of reliability. The court also found that much
of Dr. Done's calculations were based on erroneous data, that his
methods were unexplained and unverifiable by other experts and
that his presentation of the results to the jury was confusing and
misleading."8 6
IV. ANALYSIS: THE PROPOSED STANDARD
The Third Circuit was correct in identifying Dr. Done's
analysis as a novel scientific technique. However, it should have
made the District of Columbia Circuit's "frontier of epidemio-
logical inquiry" formulation a part of its analysis. 187 A determi-
nation that a causation issue is at the frontier of epidemiological
inquiry should be a prerequisite to admitting testimony based
on studies that do not attain statistical significance. In making
this determination, trial courts should take into account the
power of the studies by referring to medical and epidemiological
peer-reviewed literature. 18 They may enlist the aid of a quali-
fied epidemiologist, as provided under Federal Rule of Evidence
706, to determine whether epidemiological studies are large
enough to provide meaningful results.18 9
The Richardson court recognized that the Ferebee standard
was too lenient-plaintiffs who brought claims essentially unt-
ested in the medical arena could take advantage of the average
juror's lack of scientific knowledge. The Richardson court reme-
died this weakness by making a valid distinction between issues
at the "frontier of epidemiological inquiry" and those estab-
lished in the scientific community.' But courts should allow
185 See supra notes 155, 168 and accompanying text.
186 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992).
187 Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 120-21, 152 and accompanying text.
188 For a discussion of "power," see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
188 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956. Rule 706 provides for court appointed experts.
190 Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 120-21, 152 and accompanying text.
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deviation from accepted scientific practice only when there is a
sound policy reason at stake. Only if courts decide that there is
insufficient research on the issue should they admit testimony
based on a lower standard than that accepted by the epidemio-
logical community. This is a more logical way to approach the
problem of novel causation evidence.
The literature on Bendectin and limb reduction defects is
sparse. As a result of this low incidence rate of limb reduction
defects, the sample sizes and the power of the epidemiological
studies are less than ideal. 91 However, considering the compre-
hensive inquiry by the FDA panel in 1980 and the over thirty-
five published studies on Bendectin and birth defects to date,
the causation issue here is well out of the "frontier" of epidemio-
logical inquiry. 92 The district court, on remand, was correct in
stressing the value of the epidemiological studies with greater
power and in excluding Dr. Done's testimony.93 At this stage in
Bendectin litigation, statistical significance should be required
before allowing an expert to testify to causation based on epide-
miological studies."9
A. Scientific Versus Legal Perspectives on Statistical
Evidence
For the epidemiologist, type I error (false positive) is a
191 Hinds, supra note 55, at 12.
192 See Wojcik, supra note 3, at 3. The causation issue for Bendectin is no longer
novel. "'Nearly 7 years after the drug's withdrawal, says Richard Leavitt, director of
science information for the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation... there is still a
general consensus among teratologists that Bendectin was one of the best studied drugs
of all time for use in pregnancy and the great preponderance of evidence generally exon-
erates it from any harmful effect."' Scolnick, supra, note 52, at 1468.
One commentator, who has reviewed all of the epidemiological evidence on Bendec-
tin, has concluded that the sample sizes in many of the studies allowed for "relatively
powerful analyses." Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life
Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HAsTrsGs L.J. 301, 345 (1992). He concluded that it was highly
unlikely that these studies would miss a correlation between the drug and birth defects if
one existed. Id.
193 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992).
19 The Third Circuit's purpose in applying the Downing standard in DeLuca was to
help establish and define a rule for future application and not to change the district
court's result in that case. Similarly, after the Third Circuit's remand in the Downing
case, the district court again excluded the expert testimony, after applying the new test
set forth by the Third Circuit. United States v. Downing, 609 F.Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.
1985). This determination by the district court in Downing on the second time around
was upheld on appeal. United States v. Downing, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1935).
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greater evil than type II error (false negative). A positive result
will be reported and relied upon by subsequent researchers. 195
Negative results often go unreported and, in any event, will not
provide a basis for a scientific conclusion. 198 Epidemiologists,
like other scientists, postpone a report of causation until there is
a relatively high level of confidence in their findings."' This con-
servative approach is consistent with science's penchant for ac-
curacy and is perfectly reasonable, considering that scientists
have the option of reserving judgment on causation issues.19e
The research may be replicated subiequently and the study may
be improved to increase its validity.199 This is why epidemiology,
by convention, has set the significance level at .05, at which the
probability of a type I error is 5% while that for a type II error
may be as high as 50%. Given the opportunity for repeated
studies, larger sample groups and improved designs, researchers
can more easily marshal sufficient evidence to support their hy-
potheses at a high level of significance. 200
In the context of civil litigation, however, requiring statisti-
cal significance for a novel causation issue imposes too great a
burden on plaintiffs.20 ' While the scientific community has a
much stronger aversion to type I error than type II error, as
noted above, the legal community is equally concerned with
both types of error in civil litigation.202 As Justice Harlan ex-
plained in his influential concurring opinion in In Re Win-
ship,20 3 the "comparative social disutility" of a wrongful verdict
1"I Nesson, supra note 47, at 529-32; Cohen, supra note 39, at 412.
19' Nesson, supra note 47, at 529 n.26; Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Chemical Carcinogens: A Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 50 Fed.
Reg. 10371-442 (March 1985) ("A high-quality negative epidemiological study, while use-
ful, cannot prove the absence of an association between chemical exposure and human
cancer.").
1 See Nesson, supra note 47, at 529-30.
198 Id. Cohen, supra note 39, at 412.
See Kreiling, supra note 27, at 965-71; Black, supra note 30, at 618 n.101.
200 As the sample size of a study increases, the confidence interval narrows, and thus
it becomes easier to obtain statistically significant results. Cohen, supra note 39, at 397-
401.
201 Kaye, supra note 33, at 1345, 1354; Kaye, supra note 146, at 20.
202 Kaye, supra note 146, at 19-20; Cohen, supra note 39, at 413-14.
202 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required during adjudica-
tory stage when a minor is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if commit-
ted by an adult).
Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two
types of erroneous outcomes [false conviction and false acquittal], the choice of
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for a plaintiff is no greater than that of a wrongful verdict for a
defendant in a civil trial.2°
The plaintiff has only one opportunity to present a case for
causation and courts do not have the option of reserving judg-
ment: they must decide the issue conclusively.20  The plaintiff
will not be allowed to follow with subsequent studies.
Plaintiffs may not find themselves at a disadvantage when
the causation issue upon which they offer evidence has been
thoroughly researched over a vast period of time.00 More con-
the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a ra-
tional world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social diutility of each
.... In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for exam-
ple, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous ver-
dict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
plaintiff's favor. A preponderance of the evidence standard therefore seems pe-
culiarly appropriate for, as explained most sensibly, it simply requires the trier
of fact "to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonex-
istence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to per-
suade the [judge] of the fact's existence."
Winship, 397 U.S. at 371-72 (quoting F. J=Es, CnUL PaoCEDoUs, 250-1 (1965))(Harlan,
J., concurring).
In another landmark case, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the preponderance
of the evidence standard requires the litigants to "share the risk of error in roughly equal
fashion." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
204 Criminal trials involve a different allocation of "comparative social disutility."
Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). The social disutility of a false convic-
tion is much greater than that of a false acquittal. This is why the reasonable doubt
standard is used for criminal trials as opposed to the preponderance of evidence stan-
dard. Id.
' Nesson, supra note 47, at 529-30; Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of
Limitations in Toxic Substance Litigation, 76 CAL. L REy. 965, 995-96 (1988).
The mandate of our legal system is] to resolve conflicts, even seemingly intrac-
table conflicts, from which we cannot retreat when parties involve the machin-
ery of the legal system. In this sense, the jury represents neither the ideal arbi-
tration of the scientific conflict, nor its permanent resolution, but simply the
essential voice of the community in solving one problem fairly brought before
it. Let the experts settle the larger dispute in due time; we have cases to
resolve.
Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,1128-29 (5th Cir. 1991)(Reavely, J.,
dissenting).
2'8 For example, the link between asbestos and cancer has been extensively studied,
as "[k]nowledge of the potential health hazards of asbestos also dates back to ancient
times." In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 735
(E.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion of asbestos, see Green, supra note 205, at 994 ("The
history of asbestos litigation demonstrates that as time passes, more and better evidence
is uncovered about the industry's and particular defendant's knowledge concerning the
dangers of asbestos products to the variety of circumstances in which people were ex-
posed."). By contrast, little is known about the risk posed to humans by dioxin. See Fred
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clusive results can be inferred from a vast literature of scientific
studies. But asking plaintiffs to prove significance at the .05
level is unduly burdensome when the causation issue is new, the
malady in question is rare, or there is otherwise insufficient data
6n the issue. As previously noted, epidemiological studies with
small sample sizes tend to yield wide confidence intervals, mak-
ing it more difficult to attain statistically significant results.20 7
Epidemiological evidence may have strong probative value
yet fail to attain statistical significance.0 8 It is quite possible
that a drug currently only suspected to be a teratogen may be
proved harmful at a statistically significant level in the future.209
To preclude plaintiffs from presenting causation evidence on a
drug may rob plaintiffs of a rightful verdict simply because the
strong showing of proof required by epidemiology was not avail-
able at trial. Such an outcome may undermine public faith in
the ability of the legal system to adjudicate toxic tort cases
fairly.21 0
The prospect of insufficient evidence of causation is not im-
plausible, even after there has been a considerable amount of
time to study a drug. As noted, there are special difficulties in-
volved in trying to link a drug to specific birth defects or other
rare maladies because of the very low incidence rates involved.2 11
H. Tschirley, Dioxin, SCL Am, Feb. 1986, at 29.
207 See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
208 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 948 ("it is 'much more likely that the [true] parameter [i.e.
the true relationship between the studied variables] is located centrally within an inter-
val than it is that the parameter is located near the limits of the interval'.").
z" Nesson, supra note 47, at 537 (on the prospect that Agent Orange may be proved
toxic in the future); Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 780; Green, supra note 205, at
975-76 (epidemiological studies are large, expensive undertakings and are often beyond
the means of toxic tort plaintiffs). For the particular difficulty in determining drugs to be
teratogens, see Hinds, supra, note 55, at 12, where it is compared to "searching for a
needle in a haystack." The difficulty is in linking a drug to a specific type of birth defect.
According to then acting director of the FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation,
"[t]heoretically, a good study of a drug to be used by pregnant women might involve a
sample of several hundred pregnant women... but if you wanted to find out if the drug
was associated with a specific defect you would need a study population of many
thousands of pregnant women, and even if a drug was associated with the rare defect,
you might not find it in this sample." Id.
210 Nesson, supra note 47, at 537; Green, supra note 205, at 969, 1010.
211 According to an acting director of the FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation,
premarket studies cannot insure that drugs pose no risk to fetuses. Hinds, supra note
190, at 12. This problem is not limited to studies of birth defects; it applies to all rare
defects/diseases.
The rarity of small-cell colon cancer creates virtually insurmountable obstacles
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In addition, for obvious ethical reasons, suspected toxins or
teratogens will not be administered on humans specifically for
testing purposes. 2  Therefore, in studying them, scientists often
cannot conduct the preferred prospective studies, but must rely
on retrospective studies, studying those who have already been
exposed. These retrospective studies provide less certainty in de-
termining causation.2 1 3 Accordingly, it takes more time to amass
sufficient proof of causation through epidemiological evidence
when a drug is a suspected toxin.1 4 Furthermore, sound epide-
miological studies are often large, difficult and expensive under-
to statistically significant epidemiological studies. Accordingly, the majority of
regimen creates virtually insurmountable obstacles to claimants suffering from
rare or new diseases ... The population has many times been expoed to un-
known health hazards-with consequent injuries such as adenocarcinoma, pel-
vic inflammatory disease, toxic shock syndrome, and Guillian-Barre Syn-
drome-but a rigid alliance between law and epidemiology conspired to
prevent recovery until a "statistically significant" number of deaths and inju-
ries occurred. [citing Wendy E. Wagner, Trans-Science in Torts, 96 YAL LJ.
428, 429 (1986)]. Since the plaintiff in any event bears the burden of persua-
sion, and since the "more probable than not" causation standard already forces
victims to bear significant losses without recompense, those cases adopting a
less stringent view of scientific proof surely promotes the more enlightened and
humane view of text law.
Christophersen, 939 F.2d 1106, 1128 n.19 (5th Cir. 1991)(Reavley, J., dissenting).
21 According to an acting director of the FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation,
"'Ideally, we would like to have information on the drugs' effect on pregnant vomen, but
it is an ethical question, and drug investigators cannot test experimental drugs on preg-
nant women.. .' As a result little is known about the effect most non-obstetric drugs
have on human fetuses." Hinds, supra note 190, at 12.
13 See Green, supra note 205, at 995-96. A notable example is the Agent Orange
research.
24 Another problem with retrospective studies is the selective memory problem. In
the case of Bendectin, mothers of children with birth defects are more likely to remem-
ber having taken the drug than other mothers. The potential for error of this type may
harm the validity of study.
In Brock the court explained possible validity problems with the epidemiological
studies, such as the "selective memory problem" and the possibility that another factor
(smoking) may be causing the birth defects Brock v. Merrell Dow Co., 874 F.2d 307, 311-
312 (5th Cir. 1989). The court then stated that "[flortunately, we do not have to resolve
any of the above [problems with validity of the epidemiological studies], since the stud-
ies presented to us incorporate the possibility of these factors by use of a confidence
interval." Id. This statement is inaccurate. The confidence interval (statistical signifi-
cance) is used to determine the probability that differences between the exposed and
non-exposed groups are due to chance, assuming that the two group3 are otherwise the
same. The confidence interval cannot cure problems with the validity of a study. Black &
Lilienfeld, supra note 16, at 756-56 n.104. However, there are other statistical tests avail-
able to "adjust the relative risk to account for the differences between [the exposed and
non-exposed groups]." Id. at 756-57 n.103.
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takings.21 For example, the Agent Orange study mentioned by
Judge Weinstein was never completed because of difficulties in
determining human exposure to the herbicide.2 1
Given these uncertainties, the best way to guarantee plain-
tiffs a fair trial on novel causation issues is to allow them to
proffer the best available epidemiological evidence, regardless of
its statistical significance at the .05 level. The priority of the le-
gal system is to discover the truth of issues before it on the best
available evidence. Courts should not hesitate to modify eviden-
tiary rules so as to provide fact finders with more relevant evi-
dence on which to base a decision.21
B. Using the Statute of Limitations to Improve Accuracy
Ideally, there would seem to be a better approach for novel
causation evidence than lowering the standard of admissibility
for expert testimony.218 The scientific uncertainty involved in a
novel causation issue might be better dealt with by extending or
eliminating the statute of limitations on the claim.21 Allowing
toxic tort plaintiffs to file their claims when causation has been
firmly established by the scientific community provides a rem-
edy for those who cannot immediately prove causation without
compromising the quality of proof.220 Determinations of causa-
tion can then be based on more expansive and reliable informa-
tion.221 The delay that plaintiffs may suffer before recovering on
21'5 Nesson, supra note 47, at 537-38. For what an epidemiological study involves, see
supra notes 25-38.
21 See supra note 104.
217 As stated by Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals in Fleury v. Edwards,
14 N.Y.2d 334, 341, 200 N.E. 2d 550, 557, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 654 (1964): "The common
law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by the courts of this and other jurisdic-
tions to meet the demands of modem litigation. . . .Absent some strong public policy
or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legislature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to
further, not frustrate, the truth-finding function of the courts in civil cases." The Federal
Rules of Evidence also support a liberal view of admissibility. According to the Third
Circuit, "there is a 'presumption of helpfulness' accorded expert testimony generally
under Fed. R. Evid. 702." United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir. 1985)
(quoting from In re Japanese Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983). The
Federal Rules favor the admissibility of any relevant evidence. WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 136, at § 702-44; McCoRMICK, supra note 27, at 607.
F See generally Green, supra note 205.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 970.
221 Id. at 996-97, 1011-12.
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their claims is a reasonable sacrifice for the relative certainty of
the judgments that follow.22
However, there are several problems with such a formula-
tion. First, the discovery rules currently used in most jurisdic-
tions do not allow such a result.223 Almost all states that apply a
discovery rule allow a statute to be tolled only until the plaintiff
discovered, or should have discovered through due diligence, the
cause of injury.2 24 These statutes do not allow for postponement
until causation is established by the scientific community, but
only until the plaintiff can identify the defendant as the source
of the injury.225 The second problem in setting a discovery rule
22 Id. at 968-69, 994-95.
s Id. at 977-78, 982-84.
14 Id. at 983. For example, see New York's discovery rule, codified in N.Y. CiV.
PRAc. L. & P § 214-c (McKinney 1990). New York also enacted a discovery rule espe-
cially for Agent Orange, N.Y. Crv. PRac L & R. § 214-b. See Practice Commentaries at
627 (McKinney 1990). For examples of different formulations of the discovery rule in
different states, see Green, supra note 205, at 978 n.63.
22 Green, supra note 205, at 983. The result in Urland v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, 822 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1987), another Bendectin case decided by the Third Circuit,
is illustrative of this problem. In that case the court upheld a jury verdict barring the
plaintiff's claim on statute of limitations grounds. Although it used the discovery rule
under the applicable state law (Pennsylvania) to toll the statute, the court held that the
statute began to run when the plaintiff "possesse[s] the salient facts concerning the oc-
currence of his injury and who or what caused it... " Id. at 1275 (emphasis in origi-
nal)(quoting Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp., 450 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa. 1982)).
The Urlands' knowledge of causation under this standard was deemed sufficient
when they learned of the first Bendectin trial in Florida in 1980, Mekdeci v. Merrell
Nat'l Lab, 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983), which revived their suspicions that the drug
had caused birth defects in their own child. Yet only three months later, the First Circuit
in Lynch v. Merrell National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987), granted Merrell Dow's
motion for summary judgment for the failure of plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof
on causation. The results in these two cases seem inconsistent. See Green, supra note
205, at 983 n.82.
The Pennsylvania discovery rule was articulated by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court as whether "the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know. (1) that he has been
injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party's conduct." Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). The Pennsylvania stat-
ute of limitations runs for two years. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANr. § 5524(2). A more recent
Pennsylvania statute provides that the statute of limitations cannot run against a child
during the period of minority (up to age 18). 42 P. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b). However,
Urland was brought to trial before the effective date of the statute and "the minor's
tolling statute does not act to revive claims that had already been barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations prior to the effective date of the Act." Urland, 822 F.2d at
1276. New Jersey has such a minor tolling statute, N.J. Rsv. STAT. § 2A.14-21 (1987), that
allowed the DeLucas to bring an action for their daughter, who was three years old at the
time the action was brought, in New Jersey Superior Court. Brief for Appellants at 3-4,
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). The New Jersey
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that tolls the statute of limitations until scientific proof is avail-
able is that disputes will arise over when the scientific evidence
for causation is considered sufficient.226 In scientific circles there
is seldom instant acceptance, but rather a long process of confir-
mation for a new theory.227 Litigation over the limitations issue
might overshadow litigation on the substantive grounds, defeat-
ing the purpose of the statute.228 For this reason, one commenta-
tor has advocated a total elimination of statutes of limitations
for toxic tort victims when science has not sufficiently passed on
the connection between the injury and the alleged cause.2 2
C. Cost Shifting
Another problem with extending the statute of limitations
to improve accuracy has to do with incentive. Epidemiological
studies require large sample sizes to provide meaningful results.
statute of limitations for personal injury runs for two years. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:14-2
(1987).
Such inconsistent results under the discovery rule also occurred in the Agent Orange
litigation. In Fraticelli v. Dow Chemical Co., 611 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), Judge
Weinstein similarly held that under the Hawaii statute of limitations plaintiffs' actions
accrued at the time they "knew of the act, the damage and the causal nexus." Id. at
1288. Plaintiffs' statements on a workers' compensation claim form that they knew of
their disabilities resulting from exposure to the herbicide were enough to start the stat-
ute running. In the same opinion, Judge Weinstein rejected plaintiffs' causation argu-
ment for lack of admissible evidence. Thus the discovery rules applied in both Urland
and Fraticelli required a finding that plaintiffs had knowledge of the cause of their inju-
ries before causation could be proved.
The Hawaii statute of limitations for injury to persons or property runs for two
years. HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1991). The Supreme Court of Hawaii articulated that
state's discovery rule as tolling the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or
reasonably should have discovered, the "negligent act, the damage, and the causal con-
nection between the former and the latter." Yamaguchi v. Queen's Medical Center, 648
P.2d 689, 693-94 (Haw. 1982).
The New York statute does take into account the "technical, scientific or medical
knowledge" in determining causation for purposes of its discovery rule, but it tolls the
statute for only a maximum of five years. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney
1990). If, during this time, the plaintiff can "demonstrate that the state of medical or
scientific knowledge was such that the causation of his injury could not have been identi-
fied" within the normal statutory period, the statute will the begin to run for one year.
Practice Commentaries, at 634-35 (McKinney 1990).
226 Green, supra note 205, at 983-84. See also NY. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c, Prac-
tice Commentaries at 635 (McKinney 1990)(in reference to the New York discovery
rule).
117 See Black, supra note 30, at 622-27; Kreiling, supra note 27, at 965-71.
28 Green, supra note 205, at 983-84.
229 Id.
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Such studies are generally large and expensive undertakings, re-
quiring institutional funding. 230 Most toxic tort plaintiffs do not
have the means or money to organize them and must rely on
those studies conducted by others with a motive to incur such
expense-usually the government or defendant
manufacturers.231
The government will generally undertake such an expense
when there is strong suspicion that a widely used substance is
toxic and likely to affect a considerable segment of the popula-
tion.32 A defendant drug manufacturer has little incentive to
conduct epidemiological studies on a product that is allegedly
toxic. For drug manufacturers, it is better to let the state of sci-
entific knowledge on the product remain unclear than to provide
potential plaintiffs with ammunition for a toxic tort suit.233
Allowing epidemiological studies into evidence that show an
association between a drug and disease, but do not attain statis-
tical significance because of small sample sizes, will provide de-
fendant drug manufacturers with the incentive to commission
studies large enough to provide a clearer picture on the causa-
tion issue."' If the preliminary epidemiological evidence indi-
cates that there may be a causal connection, corporate defend-
ants will feel compelled to produce more reliable evidence
negating this connection, rather than risk losing a verdict on the
current, more speculative evidence.
Laying this expense at the manufacturers' feet is not unfair
=0 Id.
221 The FDA requires drug manufacturers to test all new products for safety and
submit the results of all studies to the agency prior to approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1983);
H. GRABowsuI & J. BERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHumAcEur1CAis. BALANCING THE BEN-
Fprrs AND RIsKs 4 (1983).
232 The Center for Disease Control ("CDC") conducted studies on Agent Orange and
the swine-flu epidemic. See Malcolm Gladwell, U.S. Firms Abandoning Birth Control
Industry in Wake of Lawsuits, WAs. PosT, May 1, 1988, at Ji. "At its peak use, an
estimated 20% to 25% of pregnant women in the United States used Bendectin."
Scolnick, supra note 52.
2'3 In the case of Bendectin, it might also be noted that no more epidemiological
research is forthcoming, as it has been withdrawn from the market in this country. Thus
plaintiffs would have nothing to gain by waiting.
2" Sustained litigation over a drug alleged to be harmful tends to affect an increase
in the amount of scientific research conducted on the drug. The Bendectin litigation
provided a clear example of this phenomenon. Sanders, supra note 192, at 346 ('The
volume and sophistication of studies focusing specifically on Bendectin was, in large part
the result of the litigation.").
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or unreasonable. Manufacturers should bear the expense of as-
certaining the safety of products from which they profit. They
are also better able to distribute the cost because they set prices.
The FDA already requires manufacturers to test their own prod-
ucts and provide the agency with their results.23 The FDA has
been criticized for allowing drug manufacturers to rush products
to the market without adequate testing for safety. Allowing pre-
liminary epidemiological evidence into the courtroom would help
toxic tort litigation serve as a check on the efficacy of the
FDA.23 6
CONCLUSION
Courts should follow the standards set by epidemiologists in
determining causation, unless the causation issue stands at the
"frontier" of epidemiological inquiry. If the causation issue is in
the frontier, courts should admit the currently available epide-
miological evidence and allow expert testimony on causation to
provide for as fair a trial as possible given the lack of definitive
research on the issue. This will encourage drug manufacturers to
provide for adequate research in ascertaining the safety of their
products, at least when that safety is called into question.
This proposed standard takes into account the factors that
make legal inquiry different from scientific inquiry.37 It encour-
ages courts to analyze the reasoning behind use of the .05 signifi-
cance level in scientific research. Such a standard also allows
courts to decide the conditions under which this scientific con-
vention is inappropriate and to better tailor the fact finding in-
quiry into the circumstances of the case. The proposed standard
concerns only admissibility; any problems with inferring causa-
tion from a standard less than .05 significance can be dealt with
by attacks on the weight of the evidence during cross-
examination. 38
235 See supra note 230.
13 The FDA has, on occasion, failed to root out harmful drugs from the market, as
was the case with D.E.S. For other examples, see Sanders, supra note 192, at 312-16.
237 See Cohen, supra note 39, at 412; Kaye, supra note 146, at 20; Nesson, supra
note 47, at 528-30.
230 See MCCORMICK, supra note 27, at 650; United States v. Downing, 736 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985).
Even if admitted, the epidemiological evidence may nonetheless be found insuffi-
cient to defeat a motion for summary judgment or j.n.o.v. See Marder v. G.D. Searle, 630
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The Third Circuit's adoption of the Downing test in
DeLuca was a major improvement over the use of the Ferebee
and Frye standards by other Bendectin courts. However, the
Third Circuit in DeLuca failed to give sufficient guidance to the
district court on when experts may testify to causation based on
non-significant epidemiological evidence. Since the admissibility
of novel causation evidence without statistical significance con-
tinues to be an issue, the time is ripe to establish a workable
standard."'
Constantine Kokkoris
EDrrOR's NoTE
On October 13, 1992 the United States Supreme Court
agreed to hear an appeal of the Ninth Circuit case Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 0 The issue is whether Con-
gress's adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes the
judicially created Frye rule.2 41 The Court will consider how
widely accepted a scientific theory must be for it to be admissi-
ble as evidence in federal courts.4 2
F. Supp. 1087, 1093-94 (D.Md. 1986) ("Rule 703, Fed. R. Evid. was intended to broaden
the acceptable bases of expert opinion and to enable reliable evidence to be admitted.
Admitting such evidence does not preclude the possibility of removing the case from the
jury at a later stage if it is determined that in its totality the evidence was insuficient")
Id. at 1094 (citing Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler, 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). In
Marder the court "erred on the side of admissibility to allow the jury access to the maxi-
mum amount of evidence available." Marder, 630 F. Supp. at 1093.94.
29 For example, there is nationwide litigation pending over the drug Prozac. Prozac
is a drug prescribed to psychiatric patients to combat depression. It is alleged that the
drug causes suicidal behavior in its users, but none of the studies done on it have at-
tained statistical significance. Once again, the problem is that there is a very low inci-
dence rate of suicide, even for those taking the drug. See Paula Span, The Man Behind
the Bitter Pill Debate, WAsmi PosT, Aug. 14, 1991, at Cl; Natalie Angier, Eli Lilly Fac-
ing Million-Dollar Suits on its Antidepressant Drug Prozac, N.Y. TwMs, Aug. 16, 1990,
at B13.
240 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. Oct 13,
1992) (No. 92-102). For a discussion of Daubert, see supra notes 135-36 and accompany-
ing text. For a review of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, see supra notes 167-68, 171 and
accompanying text.
24M See Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Rule on Admissibility of Scientific Eui-
dence in U.S. Courts, N.Y. TimS, Oct. 14, 1992, at A16; supra note 136.
2,2 Greenhouse, supra note 241, at A16.
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